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On Speaking of Experience:
Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model
Raymond M. Herbenick
The term 'experience' is obviously used in a variety of ordinary ways in
daily life situations and in a multitude of technical ways in both psychological
and philosophical matters. Unfortunately, this amenability of the term 'experience' to such a variety of employments often leads some philosophical pundits
to point out the futility involved in attempting to discuss the topic of experience.
On this view, experience is regarded as an unanalyzable, intuitive ultimate of
sorts or the term 'experience' is taken as a logically primitive term. No doubt
this reluctance to discuss the concept of experience takes into account Wittgenstein's admonitions against what he called certain "dead-ends in philosophy"
and "misleading analogies between the form of expression in different regions
of language".! But it also glosses over Wittgenstein's provocative suggestion that
the super-concept of experience as used in the context of a theory of language
may very well have a "humble use" much as the words 'table' , 'lamp', and 'door'.2
Now this super-concept of experience in its super-order relationships with
such other super-concepts as proposition, world, proof and truth will not be
treated. Nor will the use of the term 'experience' in strictly non-technical contexts , e.g., in humble utterance such as "Experience is the best teacher", or,
"One learns from experience", or, " Work experience is required". Rather I
shall be concerned with certain psychological and philosophical uses of the
term experience in ways that are often suggestive of a conceptual scheme or
model for the description, understanding and explanation of human behavior.
For example, William James speaks of that immediate flux of life which furnishes
the material for our subsequent reflections as "pure experience".3 E. C. Tolman
regards immediately given experience as a "common matrix out of which both
physics and psychology are evolved".4 The Gestalt psychologist K. Koffka conceives experience as the "dynamic relation between the field of forces of the
ego and the object," a kind of vectorial magnitude. 5 Hayek in his book The Sensory
Order regards experience as fundamentally a pre-sensory "linkage" or formation
of new connexions by the simultaneous occurrence of several afferent impulses. 6
Professor Schrag notes the "vectorial" character of experience and further
suggests that the "mixing of metaphors whereby experience is depicted at once
as a field and as a stream" is required by the phenomena themselves'? In fact,
Professor Schrag goes on to state that:
The experienced world is a concretely delivered configurative field and
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dynamic process of pre-reflective and reflective experiencing, intentionally directed to figure and background, affording both non-thematic
and thematic significance, with an engaged and embodied experience
at its center.8
All of this is but a selective indication of the interest in the topic of experience
demonstrated by psychologists and philosophers.
It is in this context that I shall deal with the use of the term 'experience' as
found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, a phenomenology which
purports to offer an alternative view of experience to those commonly based on
conceptual models used in physiological-neurological contexts and psychoanalyticpsychiatric contexts. In some physiological and neurological contexts, experience
is conceptually modelled along the lines of the stimulus-response structure of
reflex arc theory, while in some psychoanalytic and psychiatric contexts, experience is conceptually modelled along the lines of the stimulus-response structure
found in the theory of the unconscious. It is to these conceptual models of experience that Merleau-Ponty addresses himself in offering a description, understanding, and explanation of the experience of human behavior as intentional.
It should be noted that nowhere does Merleau-Ponty deny the validity of reflex
arc theory (although he does question the validity of the theory of the unconsciousness) so long as the conceptual model is viewed in the light of total human
experience. Typical of this view are Merleau-Ponty's remarks in his essay "From
Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss" (Signs) concerning anthropological science. One
must in virtue of anthropology "neither try to prove the primitive is wrong nor
to side with him against us but to set itself upon a ground where we shall both
be intelligible without any reduction or rash transposition" .9 Before examining
Merleau-Ponty's concept of experience, however, it is crucial that the record
be set straight on a number of misrepresentations and misinterpretations of his
methodology.
A review of critical works on Merleau-Ponty's thought shows the diversity
of critical interpretation and disparity in assessment. No doubt he would find
this both amusing and dissatisfying- much as Descartes did as evidenced by
Descartes' injunction to his readers against his "ivy-climbing" commentators and
disciples in Part VI of the Discours. For example, Gurwitsch believes that MerleauPonty inadequately pursued "consistent and thoroughgoing investigation of the
noematic aspects of perception"IO while Zaner faults Merleau-Ponty for his rejection of noetic reflection in favor of noematic reflection. 11 De Waelhens claims
that Merleau-Ponty clearly recognized the problem involved in the phenomenon
of 'my body qua mine',12 while Zaner denies the claim on the view that MerleauPonty begs the question with his concept of the anonymous body.13 Professor
Schrag contends that Merleau-Ponty should be credited with exposing the "bogus
dichotomies of experience" 14 but Ballard argues that the French phenomenologist's
appeal to existence is not a solution to the realist-idealist dispute on experience. 15
Some commentators even seem to be strange bedfellows with themselves.
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Ballard, for example, maintains that the descriptions produced by Merleau-Ponty
are the result of the mythological function of language and thus have the status
of myths. Yet, he proceeds to marvel at the "excellence of his descriptions and
importance of his views",1 6 Zaner, too, after what he takes to be his devastating
critique of Merleau-Ponty's methodology and philosophical theses, winds up
with a definition of the requisite phenomenology of the human body hardly
distinguishable from that of Merleau-Ponty's.17 While systematically outlining
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, Professor Kwant warns that a systematic survey
of Merleau-Ponty's ideas on the body-subject is incompatible with the understanding of his philosophy.IS
The preceding comments are rather harmless criticisms and evaluations, aimed
no doubt at the proverbial 'straw-man'. But others are not so inconsequential-especially if one expects to elucidate Merleau-Ponty's concept of experience
I have in mind those comments, stateable in the form of three theses, which
have been uncritically accepted by a number of commentators on Merleau-Ponty's
thought. These theses, which I later hope to show as patently misguided, may
be stated in the following manner:
Thesis 1-Merleau-Ponty skeptically denies reflection in principle.
Thesis 2-Merleau-Ponty skeptically denies adequate reflection in principle.
Thesis 3-Merleau-Ponty advocates as the only alternate way of knowing
to analytic reflection a "philosophical ventriloquism" in the
form of radical reflection, existential analysis, lyricism, or
mythologizing.
Thesis 1 is maintained by de Waelhens, who contends that for Merleau-Ponty
it is "impossible to get outside perception", 19 and by Zaner, who argues that for
Merleau-Ponty the "cognitive act of apprehension is unable to apprehend lived
experience".2o Thesis 2 is held by Kwant, who believes that for Merleau-Ponty
reflection (especially through inductive methods) cannot adequately "indicate
pre-conscious intentions" .21 Finally, Thesis 3 is maintained by Zaner, who believes that Merleau-Ponty allows "living the body" as the alternative to analytic
reflection,22 and by Ballard, who observes that Merleau-Ponty does not deny the
validity of scientific knowledge but tries to formulate a context out of which
scientific knowing emerges-a context describable without recourse to physical or
mathematical models on the conditions that: (1) one assumes a docile presuppositionless attitude; (2) that one contemplates the phenomena in silent astonishment; (3) that one leaps beyond common language usage to myth by way of
analogy and animistic images; (4) that one seeks a psychoanalytic-empathetic
understanding of the phenomena,23 or, in brief. on the condition that one seeks
to "impart a certain experience rather than a new principle or a new way of
rendering experience intelligible. 24
Now, on the basis of these uncritically accepted theses, it is fashionable to
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set up the following dilemma, as Ballard does,25 namely that, if pre-cognitive
experience is unknowable, then the domain of the pre-cognitive remains precognitive and thus ascribable as 'ambiguous', and that, if the pre-cognitive is
knowable, then the pre-cognitive is not strictly pre-cognitive and thus not
ascribable as 'ambiguous'. Granted the first horn of the dilemma, the precognitive domain of experience would be unintelligible. Granted the second horn
of the dilemma, the pre-cognitive domain would only be pre-cognitive in a nominal
sense since it would be intelligible. However, this dilemma supposes a determinancy principle of transparency of consciousness principle. If one instead assumes an indeterminancy principle or non-transparency of consciousness principle
-as Merleau-Ponty does 26-then one can escape the horns of the dilemma by
maintaining that the pre-cognitive is knowable in some respects and under certain circumstances and in virtue of certain modes of knowing but that it is also
unknown or unknowable in other respects and under other circumstances
for want of certain modes of knowing. But one can also escape the horns of
the dilemma by showing that each of the three theses upon which it may rest
inadequately states Merleau-Ponty's views on the role of reflection. Now each
of these three theses denies reflection upon the pre-reflective on the premise
that Merleau-Ponty's methodology provides no reflective method for conceptually
modelling or pre-reflective experience. At best, Thesis 3 attributes to MerleauPonty's methodology what J. 1. Austin in his article "The Meaning of a Word"
calls 'demonstrating the semantics of a word', i.e., the procedure used in ordinary
life whereby one speaker disposes another person to imagine or even actually to
experience situations that are appropriately and inappropriately talked about
through language. 27 No one denies that many of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of
experience are given through this procedure of demonstrating the semantics of
a word. Hence, Ballard is right in his contention that Merleau-Ponty is attempting
to "impart a certain experience". However, to maintain that Merleau-Ponty's
methodology of description is simply a matter of demonstrating the semantics
of certain expressions is to grossly misrepresent his methodology and make unintelligible much of his early work in The Structure of Behavior and in The
Phenomenology of Perception . Contrary to Ballard's view, Merleau-Ponty does
seek to impart a new principle or a new way of rendering experience intelligible
through the reflective procedure of intentional analysis. I suggest that part of
the reason why commentators have a difficulty in recognizing the systematic
account of human behavioral experience given by Merleau-Ponty (e.g., Zaner28
writes that "we must proceed with caution in order to unravel this extremely
complex notion of the intentional arc since we have practically no clues from
Merleau-Ponty") is their uncritical adherence to Thesis 1, 2, and/or 3 or some
variant thereof whereupon one overlooks his descriptions of experience apparently
produced through reflective intentional analysis with its inherent presuppositions.
I propose therefore to anticipate discussion of Merleau-Ponty's concept of
experience by first showing Merleau-Ponty's method of intentional analysis as
an alternative to the technique of 'demonstrating the semantics of a word'. To

68
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol8/iss1/9

4

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model
do this, I will briefly consider three points: (a) Merleau-Ponty's statements of
intent with regard to intentional analysis; (b) Merleau-Ponty's statement of
the theory of intentional analysis; and lastly (c) Merleau-Ponty's statement of
the presupposition of intentional analysis .
Careful analysis of The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception
shows the complex set of objectives apparently instrumental to Merleau-Ponty's
task of elucidating human action. None of these objectives serves to rule out the
possibility of reflection upon the pre-reflective. In the former work, MerleauPonty questions the following theses:
(1) the study of human behavior requires the rejection of the notions of

intention, utility, or value as subjective in order to understand human
behavior;29
(2) the study of human behavior requires the rejection of certain "aims

of life" apparent in such human actions as speech, work, or dressing
in order to describe human action;30
(3) the study of human behavior requires the reduction of seemingly

intentional behavior to the anatomical model of regulated, preestablished nerve pathways in order to explain human behavior;31
(4) the study of perceptual behavior requires the reduction of the human

body to a mosaic of sensations and perception to the physical model
of pure sensations for purposes of explanation;32
(5) the study of human behavior requires the projection of explanations

of elementary perceptual reactions by physical models in cases
involving artificial isolation of these elementary behavioral responses
from the context of action in which they are naturally integrated to
more complex responses either artificially isolated of naturally integrated for purposes of explanation. 33
That is to say, Merleau-Ponty questions any study of human behavior that seeks
to describe, understand and explain human behavior without recognizing the
'intentional' character of human experience in virtue of which one ascribes intentionality to human action. Above all, he is wary of those who would obscure
the relation between blind automatism and intentional activity by setting up
an irreconcilable opposition between the two ,34 as well as of those who, while
using a classical physical model and rejecting intentionality, make "intelligence"
or "good timings" or some other escape-label intervene as an explanatory principle of certain types of human bodily behavior.35 (For example, psychologist
Clifford T. Morgan 36 after a discussion of reflex arc theory and its requirement
that complex responses be viewed as composed of numerous simple reflexes
writes that the complex scratch-reflex "happens to be a nicely timed alternation
of flexion and extension reflexes .") Now, although Merleau-Ponty rejects these
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theses, he does not thereby conclude that reflection upon experience is impossible.
Rather, as he states, he intends to "link consciousness with action" in order to
enlarge the idea of human action. 36 The total process and properties of intentional human behavior (or human action) viewed as a natural whole in a context
of action are to be described and understood through intentionality, for example,
those practical intentions of lived-realities such as may be involved in a football-game. 37 The requirements include : (1) description of a nascent perception
or lived perception that is genetically prior to verbalized or express perception;
(2) description of the phenomenal body as a center of action which radiates
over a milieu; and (3) reformulation of the notion of consciousness as a network
of intentions some of which are clear to oneself and some of which are lived
rather than known, or, as a dialectic of milieu and action in the human order
of experience. 38 Given these ambitions, it seems rather implausible that MerleauPonty would rule out the possibility of reflection upon the pre-reflective. It
seems more plausible that he would seek either a method of reflection that
serves as a viable alternative to that exemplified in experimental knowing or
seek an alternative conceptual model to those evidently employed by classic
physiologists and psychoanalysts with the understanding that such a model
may have little or no experimental value.
In his Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty is even more explicit on
the matter of alternatives to classic conceptions of experience as espoused both
by empirical and intellectualist theorists especially in their studies of perceptual
experience. Empiricist theories based on sensation, association and projectionof-memories models rely upon "blind processes in which there is nobody who
sees."39 Intellectualist theories based on attentive and judgmental models turn
the perceiving subject into an "acosmic" thinking subject. 4o The former "cannot
see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be
looking for it" while the latter fails to realize that "we need to be ignorant of
what we are looking for, or again there would be no need for 100king".41 Nevertheless, both types of theory work with an anthropomorphic definition of sensation, assume that the 'objective world' is first in time and in virtue of its meaning,
and leave no room for the indeterminate.42 This does not suggest that either type
totally overlooks the natural world.43 Nor does it suggest that either type cannot "build-up equivalents" of the sundry structures of experience. 44 Merleau-Ponty
admits that they can construct "some semblance of subjectivity".45 One apparent
objective is thus merely to point out "everything that is made incomprehensible"
by such constructions as the "reflex arc" or the "unconscious " (e.g. , the human
and cultural world) so that an inclusive account of experience may be suitably
rendered.46
Now the alternative to empirical and intellectualist theories of perceptual experience is the phenomenal field model conceived of as the "whole perceptual
context."47 On this view, consciousness is not enclosed in the body.48 Nor is
consciousness viewed as given. 49 Rather, for Merleau-Ponty, experience is given
and comes to be known through a radical reflection that enables one to become

70

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol8/iss1/9

6

Herbenick: On Speaking of Experience: Merleau-Ponty's Conceptual Model
aware of the dependence of consciousness upon an unreflective life,50 Two forms
of this radical reflection are discernible: (1) through 'living the body'51 (since the
experience of one's own body runs counter to a reflective procedure that distinguishes the field into subject and object); and (2) through adopting a "new
way of looking at things which reverses the relative positions of the clear and
obscure, which must be undertaken by everyone, whereupon it will be seen to
be justified by the abundance of phenomena which it elucidates",52 This latter
type of radical reflection presumably avoids the mistake of making models more
real than what they model "as long as the attempt is made to build up the shape
of the world instead of recognizing, as the source which stares us in the face and
as the ultimate court of appeal in our knowledge of these things, our experience
of them",53 Merleau-Ponty calls it an "intentional analysis" or an "existential
analysis",54 And it is this form or method of radical reflection upon perceptual
experience and other forms of experience that Merleau-Ponty views as a viable
alternative to empiricist-laden and intellectualist-laden theories of experience,
Now in opting for this "phenomenological positivism" Merleau-Ponty is quite
clear on these two forms of radical reflection,55 'Living the body' as a kind of
demonstration of the semantics of expressions attempts to:
(1) re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world as we live it: 56

(2) make reflection emulate the unreflective life of consciousness ;57
(3) return to the world of actual experience prior to the objective world,

restore to things their concrete physiognomy, restore to subjectivity its
inherence in history, and rediscover the phenomenal layer of living
experience ;58
(4) reawaken our experience of our body and our world;95

(5) resume contact with sensory life which is lived within ;6o
(6) revive perceptual experience buried under its own results ;61
(7) elucidate the singular fact by varying it through the imagination and then

thinking upon the invariable element of mental experience ;62
(8) get through to the individual only through the hybrid procedure of

finding an example and then stripping it of its facticity;63
(9) describe without constructing or forming ,64

But intentional analysis with its attendant phenomenal field model of experience
attempts to:
(1) give a direct description of our experience as it is without taking account

of its psychological origin and without casual explanations scientists,
historians, and sociologists may be able to provide ;65
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(2) rediscover direct experience through circumscribing the phenomenal field;66

(3) experience phenomena not as though we are ignorant of a reality leading
to which there is no methodical bridge but through an 'intentional analysis'
which makes explicit the pre-scientific life of consciousness and which
is not an irrational conversion ;67
(4) understand and make amenable to conceptualization our effective involve-

ment in the world;68
(5) understand, i.e., take in the total intention, namely, what things are for

representation and the unique mode of existing experienced ;69
(6) seek an understanding from all angles simultaneously since all views are

true provided they are not isolated or take out of context;70
(7) go back to the experiences to which words such as 'feeling', 'seeing',

'hearing' refer in order to redefine them along intentional lines ;71
(8) allow for a phenomenology of origins by broadening the notion of inten-

tionality to include intentionality in act and operative intentionality;27
(9) describe the phenomenon of the world, that is, its birth for us in that field

into which each perception sets us back, where we are as yet still alone,
where other people will appear only at a later stage, in which knowledge
and particularly the sciences have not so far ironed out and leveled down
the individual perspective. It is through this birth that we are destined
to graduate to a world , and we must therefore describe it. 73
It seems rather clear then that Merleau-Ponty does hold the view that lived ex-

perience can be reflected upon and thereby recognized through these two distinct
procedures, forms, or methods of radical reflection. Furthermore, it appears that
intentional analysis is not presuppositionless in its descriptions according to the
phenomenal field model of experience. At least this is borne out by MerleauPonty's views that:
[a) the thinker never thinks from any starting-point but the one constituted by
what he is ;74
[b) reflection is conditioned by the situation;75
[c) we begin neither without nor with psychology alone in examining perception and the phenomenal field for one must frequent the phenomenal field
through psychological description and then purge psychological description of its psychologism. 76
But what is the presupposition of intentional analysis as a form of reflection and
the phenomenal field as the conceptual model of experience? For Merleau-
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Ponty, the concept of Fundierung serves as the presupposition of intentional description of the phenomenal field of human experience in virtue of which human
behavior may be described, understood and explained.
[Technically speaking, Merleau-Ponty in Parts I and II of the Phenomenology
of Perception seeks a description and understanding of human behavior rather
than an explanation through radical reflection. But in Part III he indicates that
intentional analysis is inadequate for the explanation of human behavior and
hence suggests that a phenomenology of phenomenology is required for such explanation in terms of the temporal intentionality of the body-subject.77 ]
Fundierung is a two-way, non-casual relation of originator to originated. By
this Merleau-Ponty means, for example, that the symbolic function of consciousness rests on the visual as on a ground. 78 This implies that vision is not the cause
of the symbolic function but rather a necessary condition for the symbolic function, or, a founding term of reflection. He writes in Part III of the Phenomenology
of Perception that:
The founding term, as originator- time, the unreflective, the fact, language,
perception- is primary in the sense that the originated is presented as a
determinate or explicit form of the originator, which prevents the latter
from reabsorbing the former, and yet the originator is not primary in the
empiricist sense and the originated is not simply derived, since it is
through the originated that the originator is made manifest. 79
In viewing intentional human experience in terms of this relational concept one
should therefore, according to Merleau-Ponty, recognize beneath the intentionality
of act (e.g., thetic consciousness of objects) an 'operative' intentionality (fungi erende IntentionaliUit) which is the condition of the possibility of thetic intentionality.8o Briefly, this means that operative intentionality is taken as that which
"produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our life,
being apparent in our desires, our evaluation and in the landscape we see, more
clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge
tries to translate into precise language." 81 It means that typical intentionalities of
act such as thetic judgments and voluntary posits are subtended by other forms
of intentional experience.
Now Merleau-Ponty apparently examines the basic intentional structure of
human experience, which he calls "etre-au-monde,"82 in terms of this relational
concept of Fundierung. The lived-body or phenomenal body is construed as the
vehicle, so to speak, of etre-au-monde.83 as a "synergic system" and the "third
term" tacitly understood in the figure -background structure, the phenomenal body
opens onto a system of "self-other-things" and is anchored to a world .84 On the
side of the world, two 'layers' may be recognized, namely, a " sedimented or
acquired world" (cultural and/or human world) and a "primary world or spontaneity" (natural or phenomenal world) .85 On the side of the phenomenal body,
two, 'layers' may be identified, namely, the "customary body" and the "momentary
body".86
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But he also examines the phenomenal body's activities in terms of the concept
of Fundierung. For example, the phenomenal body is said to be describable in
terms of motor acts, expressive acts, erotic acts, sense acts, time acts and
perceptual acts as well as explainable in terms of temporality.87 This means
according to the concept of Fundierung that motility, expression, sexuality, sensation, perception, and temporality are operative forms of basic or original intentionality. And it further implies that a "host of intentions" runs from the body
considered as a center of potential action over a milieu.88 It is in virtue of such
a "network of intentions,"89 "flow of experience,"9o and "interlocking of in tentionalities"91 that the normal human subject is said to have "integrated experience."92 And it is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty postulates that these forms
of original intentionality or processes are based on an 'intentional arc' which
goes limp in a patient whose experience has disintegrated and which endows
experience with its degrees of vitality and fruitfulness in the normal subject. 93
Borrowing the term from Fischer's Raum-Zeitstruktur und DenkstOrung in der
Schizophrenie (p. 250). Merleau-Ponty contends that this 'intentional arc' subtends
the life of consciousness (Le., cognitions, desires, and perceptions) and "projects
round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological
and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these
respects."94 In addition, it is alledged to bring about the unity of the senses and
intelligence, of sensibility and motility, etc. 9S It is this 'umweltintentionalitat' (one
single intention inferred from the phenomena of the body's synergy) that conditions either the unity of experience or the disunity of experience. 9s (However,
Merleau-Ponty confesses that it is incomprehensible how such intentionality could
come to dwell in a molecular edifice.)96
Given Merleau-Ponty's theory of intentional analysis together with its presupposition of the relational concept of Fundierung, how should human experience be characterized? How should it be described especially if it is assumed
that the phenomenal body as a center of potential activity radiates over a milieu?
I believe that if Merleau-Ponty were to respond to this question, he would reply
that two forms of intentional experience are distinguishable though inseparable:
(1) that occurring within the matrix of the cultural or human world and the personal momentary body; and (2) that occurring within the matrix of the naturalphenomenal world and the pre-personal customary body. For lack of better
terminology, I suppose the former could be termed "personal and/or interpersonal
experience" while the latter could be termed "pre-personal experience." On such
a view, the concept of man is not that of a psyche joined to an organism but "the
movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal
from and at others moves towards personal acts."97 These are, on his view, not
materially exclusive conceptions to choose from but "two stages of a unique
structure which is the concrete subject," with pre-personal experience subtending personal experience in accord with the concept of Fundierung. 98
It should be noted that the topic of pre-personal experience is not without
precedent in either philosophical or psychological contexts. Leibniz, for example,
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in his Preface to New Essays Concerning Human Understanding attacks Locke's
view of conscious perceptions and argues that there are "a thousand indications
which lead us to think that there are at every moment numberless perceptions
in us, but without apperception and without reflection; i.e., changes in the soul
itself of which we are not conscious.'99 In Book II he further contends that:
All impressions have their effect, but all the effects are not always noticeable. When I turn to one side rather than the other, it is very often through
a series of minute impressions of which I am not conscious, and which
render one movement a little more uncomfortable than the other. All
our unpremeditated actions are the result of a concurrence of minute
perceptions, and even our customs and passions, which have such influences in our deliberations, come therefrom; for, these habits grow
little by little, and, consequently, without the minute perceptions, we
should not arrive at these noticeable dispositions.t oo
More recently, Professor Gerd Brand has observed that for the later Husserl
"intentionality is functioning but at the same time is anonymous, and anonymous
on two different levels."lOl In the natural attitude of consciousness of objects,
functioning intentionality is completely anonymous , i.e., functioning but unknown. It is world-experiencing. Once uncovered through the phenomenological
reduction and intentional analysis, it is delivered from the state in which its
functioning was unknown. As Brand interprets Husserl:
When this uncovering becomes a genuine explanation, intentionality is
continuously further delivered from the anonymity characteristic of it as
functioning, but it nonetheless remains anonymous. Functioning intentionality always transcends itself, and transcends that part of itself which
is already explained and therefore already delivered from anonymity , in
the direction of the world in whose anonymity (as familiar foreign domain) it maintains itself.l 02
However, Husserl is quoted as holding that "when I 'uncover' this perception
in regard to its intentional components and just as my present experience and its
present Being-intention, then I meet new experiences, but I say, nevertheless, that
what they show, now uncovered, is the same as that which was implicitly contained in the old experience and was intended by it."103 Criticizing the view that
"thoughts go from an impersonal unconscious and 'personalize ' themselves by becoming conscious," Jean-Paul Sartre in his The Transcendence of the Ego argues
that the ego-life has its place on the reflected level while the unreflected consciousness must be considered as autonomous. 104 His conclusion is that the unreflected
has ontological priority over the reflected because unreflective consciousness does
not need to be reflected in order to exist and because reflection presupposes the
intervention of a second-degree consciousness.
In psychological contexts, several examples also may be given to illustrate the
phenomena of pre-personal experience. Gestalt psychologist K. Koffka writes that
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without the 'totally unconscious' tonic reflex, our poise and balance would not
be preserved:
At every moment of our life the tonus of our musculature is regulated.
Were it not , we could neither sit nor stand nor walk. But all these adjustments take place without our knowing about them. !Os
Even the accomodation of the oculomotor system is 'automatic ' and occurs 'unconsciously' without our taking cognizance of its taking place. In fact , he argues
we have as a rule no direct knowledge of the dynamics of our eye-movements. We
may sense that our eyes wander but this awareness of our eye-movements may
be very different from the actual eye-movements.!06 Koffka further adds:
But more often than not we are not aware of these movements at all.
When we are not, the whole interplay of forces described in the preceding discussion has no counterpart in experience, just as the interplay of
forces that produces sensory organization remains almost entirely outside
experience (which contains only the results of these dynamics). Kohler,
who was the first to emphasize this aspect of sensory organization, called
it 'silent organization' (1929, p. 371) . The silence then refers also to the
movements which contribute to this organization.!O?
Using the topology of the three mental processes developed in The Interpretation of Dreams, namely, the unconscious. the preconscious. and the conscious,
Freud applies these theoretical constructions to various types of human behavior.
For example. in his Jokes and Their Relation to th e Un cons cious Freud analyzes
jocular thought into unconscious . pre-conscious. and conscious thinking. The preconscious is said to lack the "cathexis of attention with which consciousness is
linked" and is given the name 'automatic.' lo8 The formation of jokes in the first
person involves. then. a preconscious thought which is given over for a moment
to the unconscious for revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by
conscious perception.I09 Thus. at the level of the unconscious. jokes are said to
be made but at that of the preconscious the comical and humor are said to be
found . no Carl Jung's treatment of the "unconscious" also approximates the prepersonal domain of experience. In his Aion: Contributions to th e Symbolism of
Self, he envisions the ego as the center of the field of consciousness and as resting on a psychic base and a somatic base. Each base is comprised of the conscious
and the unconscious. On the side of the somatic base there is a totality of endosomatic perceptions. Two possibilities are seen. Those stimuli crossing the threshold
of consciousness are termed "conscious perceptions" while those stimuli that remain below the threshold level of consciousness are termed "unconscious perception. " II! On the side of the psychic base. three possibilities arise with respect to
bringing psychic contents from the unconscious to consciousness. First. there may
be a temporary sublimation of psychic contents which are reproducible voluntarily
via memory; second. there may be unconscious contents which cannot be
reproduced voluntarily; and third . there may be contents incapable of being
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brought to consciousness at all but which may be hypothesized.1l2 The self or
personality therefore is the total field of consciousness and the sum total of unconscious contents resting on the psychic and somatic bases, while the ego is
conscious personality. Now the unconscious may be looked at from two standpoints according to Jung : (1) that of the psychology of consciousness; and (2) that
of the psychology of personality. On the former view, the unconscious is composed
of the somatic base with those perceptions that are subliminal to consciousness,
the psychic base of those perceptions capable of reproduction voluntarily to
consciousness, and those perceptions that cannot be known in consciousness. On
the latter view, the unconscious is composed of the personal and the impersonal,
that is, those contents acquired by the individual himself during his lifetime which
are an integral part of individual personality and could therefore just as well be
known to consciousness, and those contents that are collective and which form
an omnipresent, unchanging and everywhere identical condition or substrate of
th e psyche per se.113
The point of this brief excursion into the preceding views on pre-personal experience in philosophical and psychological contexts serves only to show that
Merleau-Ponty does not work outside of a traditional interest in the topic. No
doubt he would criticize Locke's views on the pre-natal experience of a human
person (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, 1, 21), Leibniz 's 'minute
impressions' model of experience, Husserl's contention that all aspects of functioning intentionality can be uncovered fully through the phenomenological reduction and intentional analysis , and Freud's thesis that the unconscious causally
produces events at the preconscious and conscious levels of experience. But he
would also seem to be rather comfortable with Sartre's claim of the ontological
priority of unreflective consciousness to reflective consciousness, Koffka's characterization of the 'unconscious' character of the perceptual-motor system, and perhaps (as evidenced by his later writings) Jung's conception of the unconscious. Let
us therefore examine Merleau-Ponty's conception of pre-personal experience as
found primarily in his early works, recognizing as B. Pontalis observes in his
article "Note Sur Le ProbH~me de l'Inconscient Chez Merleau-Ponty" that the
'unconscious' did not pose a specific problem in the Phenom enology of Perception
where it was subsumed under the "rubric of the prepersonal" but did become of
interest to Merleau-Ponty in his lectures on the experience of forms of passivity
(e.g., sleep, memory, unconscious) in 1955-1956 whereupon he defined the unconscious as an "ensemble of institutions more or less coordinated," as "our primordial institution," and as "symbolic matrices" in order to avoid what he called
'demonology.' 114
Granted that pre-personal experience is genetically prior to personal experience,
how shall pre-personal experience be described or indicated-especially since the
originator becomes manifest only through the originated according to the concept
of Fundierung? At least three types of descriptions or indications are distinguishable in the Phenomenology of Perception : (1) that through 'living the body' techniques viewed as forms of 'semantic demonstration; ' (2) that through 'intentional
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analysis' according to the Fundierung-based conceptual model of the phenomenal
field; and (3) through a combination of both of these maneuvers. Type 1 is exemplified as follows:
At the very moment when I live in the world, when I am given over to my
plans, my occupations, my friends , my memories, I can close my eyes,
lie down, listen to the blood pulsating in my ears, lose myself in some
pleasure or pain, and shut myself up in this anonymous life which subtends my personal one.115
The fact that my earliest years lie behind me like an unknown land is
not attributable to any chance lapse of memory, or any failure to think
back adequately; there is nothing to be known in these unexplored lands.
For example, in pre-natal existence, nothing was perceived, and therefore
there is nothing to recall. There was nothing but the raw material and
adumbration of a natural self and a natural time. This anonymous life
is merely the extreme form of that temporal dispersal which constantly
threatens the historical present,116
Type 2 may be illustrated by the following texts:
... 'living' (leben) is a primary process from which, as a starting point,
it becomes possible to 'live' (erleben) this or that world, and we must eat
and breathe before perceiving and awakening to relational living, belonging to colours and lights through sight, to sounds through hearing, to the
body of another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human
relations. Thus sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the routes,
instruments or manifestations of personal existence: the latter takes up
and absorbs into itself their existence as it is anonymously given. 117
The body is our general medium of having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating
upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative
meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is
true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally, the meaning
aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then
build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural
world. At all levels it performs the same function which is to endow the
instantaneous expressions of spontaneity with 'a little renewable action
and independent existence.'118
Finally, Type 3 may be exemplified as follows:
Bodily existence which runs through me, yet does so independently of
me, is only the barest raw material of a genuine presence in the world.
Yet at least it provides the possibility of such presence, and establishes
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our first consonance with the world. I may very well take myself away
from the human world and set aside personal existence, but only to rediscover in my body the same power, this time unnamed, by which I am
condemned to being. It may be said that the body is 'the hidden form of
being ourself.' or on the other hand, that personal existence is the taking
up and manifestation of a being in a given situatiop.119
My personal existence must be the resumption of a prepersonal tradition.
There is, therefore, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists
before I am here, and who marks out my place in it. This captive or natural spirit is my body, not that momentary body which is the instrument
of my personal choices and which fastens upon this or that world, but the
system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular focus into
a general project. 120
But what, in the sleeper and the patient, makes possible a return to the
real world, are still only impersonal functions, sense organs, and language.
We remain free in relation to sleep and sickness to the exact extent to
which we remain always involved in the waking and healthy state, ... 121
On the bases of these 'descriptions' it is clear that this pre-personal experience
(Le., the 'anonymity' of the phenomenal body and the 'generality' of the natural
world) is not simply a marginal consciousness. Nor does it exclusively pertain to
perceptual experience-although Merleau-Ponty does maintain that perception is
always in the mode of the impersonal 'one' with something anonymous in it. l22
Rather it includes on the body-subject side of etre-au-monde AT LEAST the following distinguishable factors besides perception in the Phenomenology of Perception:
(1) jiutonomous motion enabling me to perform certain actions;123
(2) the atmosphere of sexuality/ erotic perception underlying forms of expe-

rience;l24
(3) anonymous or pre-personal time of our bodily functions;125

(4) primordial silence prior to speech;126
(5) evaluations made, e.g., pain; 127

(6) someone at the core of time; 128
(7) halo of generality or atmosphere of socialty about my absolute individ-

uality.129
Pre-personal experience thus involves the complete synergic system of motility,
perception, sexuality, temporality, and language. One can therefore hold, contrary
to Professor Schrag's view,13o that for Merleau-Ponty there is a primacy of experience (namely, pre-personal experience) rather than a primacy of perceptual experience. Granted this way of 'slicing' experience, what distinguishes the pre-
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personal and what are Merleau-Ponty's reasons for so distinguishing human
experience?
With regard to the distinction made between pre-personal experience and personal experience the following lines are drawn by Merleau-Ponty:
PERSONAL SIDE OF EXPERIENCE
1. ERLEBEN: life of human relations. l3l

2. MOMENTARY BODY: instrument of personal choices fastening upon this or

that world.'32
3. CREATES A SITUATION: in understanding a book, in becoming a mathemati-

cian, or in taking up and absorbing existence as it is anonymously given.!33
4. PHENOMENAL BODY: moves towards personal acts rather than simply allow

itself to take corporeal form. 134

5. IRREDUCIBILITY: of personal acts to those of an organism. 135

6. RESPONSIBILITY: that for which I am responsible and for which decisions

are made. 136

7. INTERMITTENT INVOLVEMENT: envelope oneself in a particular context

(e.g., that of a love or of an ambition).137
PRE-PERSONAL SIDE OF EXPERIENCE
1. LEBEN: life of eating, breathing, colors, lights, sounds, sexuality, etc. l3l
2. CUSTOMARY BODY: system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every

particular focus into a general project. 132

3. EXPRESS A SITUATION: in seeing the blue sky or in serving as the routes,

manifestations, and instruments of personal existence. 133

4. PHENOMENAL BODY: allows itself to take corporeal form rather than move

towards personal acts although it allows such personal acts to be done. 134

5. IRREDUCIBILITY: of organism to personal acts of the existential self.135

6. NON-RESPONSIBILITY: that which remains marginal to the self (e.g., ex-

perience of sensation) for which I am not responsible nor for which decisions
are made. 136
7. CONTINUAL RELIANCE: rely upon in order to keep oneself alive which can

be practically taken for granted,137
In other texts not of a parallel nature in the Phenomenology of Perception, MerleauPonty speaks of personal experience as that which "gives a fresh significance
to my life"138 and that which allows one to "develop personal acts into stable
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dispositional tendencies. "139 And he similarly notes that pre-personal experience:
(1) is the counterpart to the natural world as the given and general existence of
one's sensory functions;140 (2) enables one to center his existence but not completely;141 (3) is a life of given consciousness from which there emerges a life
of the eyes, hands, ears, etc., on the fringe of one's personal life and acts;l42
(4) is in the perception of the world the "doing of pre-personal forms of consciousness" ;143 (5) includes biological existence which plays the role of an
inborn complex beneath personal life;144 and (6) includes pre-natal and infantile
experience.145 Thus, it appears that for Merleau-Ponty personal experience is the
intelligent and volitive living of human relations in a human and cultural world
whereas pre-personal experience, which "subtends" (Le., is genetically but not
logically prior) personal experience, involves at least marginal awareness, operative
bodily habits (including perception) and pre-natal experience in a setting of the
natural world.
What then are the reasons for such a distinction according to Merleau-Ponty?
Several reasons can be gleaned from the Phenomenology of Perception-although
they should not be necessarily construed as adequate warrants. First, MerleauPonty believes that such a distinction obviates the difficulties involved in the
'problem of other minds'. He argues:
If the perceiving I is genuinely an I, it cannot perceive a different one;
if the perceiving subject is anonymous, the other which it perceives is
equally so.146

Secondly, Merleau-Ponty argues that such a distinction recognizes indeterminancy
or the 'fact' that human experience does not entirely coincide with the cognitive
representations of human experience. In acknowledging the limits of knowledge
by description and by acquaintance he asserts that:
I can experience more things than I represent to myself-and my being
is not reducible to what expressly appears to me concerning myself. 147
Lastly, Merleau-Ponty argues that such a distinction helps to explain the difference observed between human behavior and animal behavior as well as between normal human behavior and disintegrated human behavior observed
even earlier in The Structure of Behavior. He claims that man requires an
habitual body because of a need for distance between self and that which elicits
actions to avoid the plight of animals believed to be embedded in a matrix of
syncretic setting and condemned to actuality.148 Without attempting to appraise
these 'justifications', it is obvious that for Merleau-Ponty the pre-personal side
and the personal side of experience are to be distinguished in order to show
the foundations upon which the symbolic function rests and to illustrate some
limits of the symbolic function of consciousness and of ourselves as knowers.149
And it is also evident that for Merleau-Ponty the pre-personal and personal sides
of human experience are distinguishable along the lines of what counts and what
does not count as properly human action.
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CONCLUSION

Granted Merleau-Ponty's theory of intentional analysis and given his description of the pre-personal in accordance with his conceptual model of experience,
what criticisms are appropriate? I suspect that contemporary linguistic theorists
of human action offer the best possibilities in this regard since they are largely
concerned with the intentional characterization of human actions from the standpoint of a language which purports to signify mental events (e.g., via such verbs
as 'believe,' 'hope,' 'wish') or to signify overt behavior (e.g., via such verbs as
'ridicule', 'hunt', 'honor'). This is further warranted , I believe, by Merleau-Ponty's
early attempts to: (1) link consciousness with action ;150 (2) view the phenomenal
body as the center of potential action over a milieu;151 (3) call attention to the
'fact' that the main areas of the phenomenal body are devoted to action ;152 and
(4) to define 'my body' as "wherever there is something to be done."153
Now there seems to be some agreement between Merleau-Ponty's views on
human action and those of certain linguistic theorists of human action. Margaret
Boden in her recent article, "Intentionality and Physical Systems ," in Philosophy
of Science,154 concedes with Merleau-Ponty that intentional description and
physical description of human action are logically distinct and thereby not intertranslatable. Features of intentionality, she says, may be explained completely
by a purely casual account (e.g., via robot simulation of Charcot's hysteric paralysis
cases) although not adequately, since "to understand why the structure of the
behavior is as it is" one must appeal to certain 'ideas' which mediate between
stimuli and responses which may be defined either in psychologically functional
terms (e.g., 'body image') or in physiological terms (e.g., 'cerebral model') .m In
his article, "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation", in Mind 156 Peter
Alexander suggests with Merleau-Ponty that the term "unconscious" does have
an ordinary usage, namely, when I say that I was unconscious of what I ate
for breakfast because I was not thinking of it or trying to recall it. And it has
an ordinary usage when there is a reason for behaving in a certain way and yet
someone is unconscious of his reason at any given time for so acting. These
ordinary uses are distinct from the technical sense of the term "unconscious " in
psychoanalysis according to which what is unconscious is beyond all normal
powers of recall. Such uses suggest instead a kind of marginal awareness of acting
or of reasons for acting-which in part for Merleau-Ponty counts as pre-personal
experience. P. F. Straws on's views in his chapter entitled "Persons" in Individuals
also resemble Merleau-Ponty's views in part. Acknowledging that each person's
body plays a unique role in his experience-especially perceptual experienceand that this unique role consists of many contingent facts such as the opening of
the eyelids, the orientation of the eyeballs, and the stance of the body in visual
perception, Straws on argues that this unique role and these facts explain at least
three things: (1) why I regard my body favorably and as more important perhaps
than any other body; (2) why I feel peculiarly attached to it; and (3) why I speak
of my body as mine. 157
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However, several important disagreements are also discernible. Boden, for
example, would no doubt regard the terms 'intentional arc', 'pre-personal experience', and perhaps 'operative intentionality' as "evasive labels", "pseudoexplanations" and or perhaps 'mind-laden theoretical terms' such as the theoretical
terms 'suggestion', 'secondary consciousness', 'dissociation of personality', and
'subordinate personality' which are often proffered in explanation of pathological
cases involving hysteric paralysis where : (1) there is no apparent physical injury or record of injury; (2) under hypnosis normal organic functioning resumes;
and (3) the extent of the injury does not coincide with the anatomy involved-although it may coincide with the layman's idea of the anatomy involved. ls8 Boden
nevertheless concedes that the postulation of cerebral models mediating between
stimulus and response in determining the molar behavior of the organism also introduces the notion of one's 'belief' about the anatomy and also thereby tends to
make more respectable the use of the term 'subordinate personality' as a psychologically functional predicate. ls9 Thus, what appears to be a strong disagreement
turns out to be an agreement between Boden and Merleau-Ponty, namely, that the
'mediator' between stimuli and responses may be conceptualized either in terms of
neurophysiology or of functional psychology. Disagreement does come, however,
on the scope of the attribution of intentionality to human agency. Boden makes it
clear that she "is not discussing the view that all psychological phenomena (including basic sentience and pain) are intentional."16o Intentional behavior is
defined on her view as that which is guided by thought, as that which requires
explanation in terms of the notion of the direction of the mind upon some
object, or as any behavior guided by the purposes, desires, beliefs, concepts,
or ideas of a psychological subject. 161 Obviously, for Merleau-Ponty, such a
limitation of the scope of intentional behavior is unacceptable however defensible in linguistic theories of human action.
A similar disagreement is voiced by Alexander. Maintaining that rational and
irrational human behavior are such that they could have been consciously planned
even if in fact that were not (e.g., habits, skills, or any behavior for which it is
possible to give reasons for and against), he then suggests that, if reflexes (e.g.,
fainting/jumping when startled) and sheer accidents of an unforeseeable nature
(e.g., unavoidably running over a pedestrian who dashes out in front of a car)
are to be termed 'behavior', then they should be called 'non-rational' behavior. 162
Non-rational behavior includes therefore any behavior of which it does not make
sense to say that it was or was not done for a reason. From Merleau-Ponty's
perspective, however, it is not clear that some of the lowest behavioral forms or
passive areas of awareness (such as sleep, unconscious, or the memory) do or do
not have reasons for which they are done. Nor is it evident that the assertion
"complicated reflexes such as the 'scratch-reflex' are not done for a reason" is
patent nonsense. The sentence 'A fly landed on my hand so I scratched it [my
hand) because it [my hand) itched" may indeed signal 'non-rational behavior' if
itching is counted a reason for scratching my hand. But it may also signal 'rational
behavior' if itching is counted a reason for scratching my hand. What Merleau-
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Ponty would no doubt seek clarification of is some criterion for counting one 's
itching as a reason or not a reason for scratching.
One final point of disagreement should be noted. On Strawson's view, the
facts concerning the unique role of my body do explain why I speak of my body
as mine. But they do not explain why I should have a concept of myself at all
as a person nor why I should ascribe certain corporeal characteristics not simply
to the body standing in this special relation to the thing to which we ascribe
thoughts and feelings but to the thing itself to which we ascribe those thoughts
and things.163 To avoid both the pretension of a 'solution' to the problem of other
minds and a priori genetic psychology, Strawson argues that such an explanation
requires a certain 'category-preference', namely, that the term 'person' be taken
as a logically primitive term while the expressions 'animated body' and 'embodied
anima' be taken as derivative terms .l64 In short, the concept of the person is
taken to be logically prior to that of an individual consciousness for the apparent reason that it is "easier to understand how we can see each other, and
ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each
other, and act in accordance with a common human nature " and with the belief
that Cartesian dualism and "no-ownership dualisms" are inadequately defensible
theses .165 Assuming the primitiveness of the concept of person, it thus appears
that material predicates (eg., 'bald,' 'pale' , 'hairy') and person-predicates (e.g.,
'hope,' 'honest', 'joy!) are equally predicable of persons inasmuch as corporeal
characteristics and states of consciousness are ascribable to persons. Now
Merleau-Ponty, if I may be somewhat presumptuous, would no doubt agree with
Straws on's objective, namely, to indicate a logically primitive term that serves
as an alternative to dualistic-laden primitive terms such as 'animated body.' But
I suspect that Merleau-Ponty would argue that, as a way of identifying particular
structures of behavior, one should choose as a logically primitive concept not
the concept of a person but the category of 'etre-au-monde' or 'embodiedcori.sciousness-engaged-in-the-world' in virtue of which one may derive the concept of the 'customary body at the natural world' (Le., pre-personal experience)
as genetically prior to that concept of the 'momentary body at the human-cultural
world' (Le., personal experience). According to the genetic non-causal relation
called Fundierung, this means that pre-personal experience is prior to personal
experience from the standpoint of origins. But it does not mean that pre-personal
experience is logically prior to personal experience. Given the primitive concept
of 'embodied-consciousness-engaged-in-the-world', it therefore appears that material-predicates (e.g., 'bald', 'white', 'tall') person-predicates (e.g., 'joy', 'wish' ,
'expectation') cultural-predicates (e.g., 'usury', 'theft', 'incest') , and pre-personpredicates (e.g., 'sleep', 'posture ', 'poise', 'tonus ') are predicable of this intentional
structure of human experience with its distinguishable poles of subject and
world, its distinguishable domains of the customary and the momentary on the
side of the subject and those of the natural and the cultural-human on the side
of the world, and its levels of personal and pre-personal experience. This does
not imply that predicates are classifiable only in terms of one of the four domain
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types of predica tes or in terms of anyon e particu lar domain
. But it does suggest that talking about either pre-per sonal experie nce or persona
l experie nce as
unders tood by Merlea u-Ponty is not in princip le imposs ible. And,
r would add,
neither idle talk nor trivial talk. Thus, when Merlea u-Ponty argues
that "r can
experie nce more things than r represe nt", he is not thereby also
arguing that "r
can experie nce more things than r can represe nt"- at least not withou
t qualific ation.
Univer sity of Dayton
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